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Case No. 20140483-CA 
IN THE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff! Appellee, 
V. 
AARON DAVID TRENT l~EEDHAM, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions on eight counts of 
communications fraud and one count of pattern of unlawful activity, all 
second degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant entered into limited joint venture agreements with 
Clement Tebbs (Clement) and his company, BACT Limited Partnership, to 
build and sell homes on specified lots (the joint venture homes). BACT 
would provide financing for materials and subcontractors. Defendant 
would do the consh·uction. Defendant made draws to cover the 
consh·uction costs, but used much of the money for unrelated purposes. 
Defendant did not dispute that he had diverted the funds, but claimed that 
Clement had authorized the diversion. 
The State charged Defendant with communication fraud and pattern 
of unlawful activity. A jury found him guilty. After judgment, he filed a 
motion for new trial. The trial court denied it. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Has Defendant shown that the trial court erred by denying his 
motion for a new trial? 
Standard of review. An appellate court typically reviews "a denial of a 
motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. 
Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, if20, 262 P.3d 1) (citation omitted). However, when the 
motion includes a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellate 
court reviews that claim as a "mixed question of law and fact, ... 
review[ing] the trial court's application of the law to the facts under a 
correctness standard." Id. (citation omitted). If there are factual findings, 
the Court "will not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous.'' Id. 
(citation omitted). 
2. Has Defendant shown that the trial court plainly erred for not sua 




Standard of Review. Because this claim is unpreserved, Defendant 
must establish plain error. He must show that error exists, that the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court, and that the error was harmful. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This constitutional provision is reproduced in Addendum A: 
U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 1 
Def end ant entered into limited joint venture agreements with 
Clement Tebbs to build homes on several lots in Washington County, Utah, 
and in Mesquite, Nevada. See State's Trial Ex. 1-5. Clement's company, 
1 The trial court clerk numbered the case transcripts from 1 to 18. 
Because these numbers appear to reference a pleadings file, the State 
prefaces those numbers with a "T." Trial transcripts are cited as T2 ( day 
one), T3 (day two), T4 (day three), T6 (day four), T7 (day five), T8 (day six), 
and T9 ( day seven). The State does not cite to TS, a partial transcript 
extracted from T4 (day three), or to Tl, a transcript of the preliminary 
hearing. The transcript of the April 9, 2014 evidentiary hearing on 
Defendant's motion for a new h·ial is cited as T18. 
The record contains both the trial exhibits filed in a large manila 
envelope, listed at R609-10, and the exhibits from the evidentiary hearing on 
Defendant's motion for a new h·ial filed in a smaller manila evelope, listed 
at R1163. 
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BACT Limited Partnership, would provide financing for the consh·uction; 
and Defendant would serve as general conh·actor for the homes, getting 
funding for the construction by making draw requests on BACT. See id.; see 
also State's Trial Ex. 24:14-19; T4:50-60. 
The charges in this case are based on transactions in connection with 
the following properties: lots 26 and 27, LaScala, Mesquite; lots 125 and 131, 
White Mesa, Mesquite; lot 78, Bloomington Ranches, St. George; and lots 28 
and 29, River Hollow, St. George. See R272-280. They were based on 
Defendant's use of some of the funds received from approximately 27 
draws on BACT for consh·uction at those locations from March 2005 
through June 2005. See State's Trial Ex. 7-13. 
Defendant began construction on the homes in approximately 
January 2005. See State's Trial Ex. 7. Between January and June, he made 
draws on BACT for several hundred thousand dollars. See State's Trial Ex. 
7-13. 
In July 2005, Clement asked Greg Adamson, a construction manager 
for Clement's son John's company, to check on the progress of construction 
on several of the joint venture lots. T6:125-129. When Adamson visited the 
sites, he found no workers and saw that almost no construction had been 
undertaken-workers had dug trenches on some lots, but had poured no 
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footings. T6:132-33. The few materials that had been delivered to the sites 
appeared to have been sitting in the sun long enough to become sun 
bleached. T6:137. 
Jolie Bown was an accountant for John Tebbs' company, Bonneville 
Builders. T6:50. She also did some work for Clement Tebbs and BACT. 
T6:51. In early August, Leonard McKneely came into her office, asked to 
speak to her personally, and closed the door. T6:63. 
Two minutes after McKneely left, Bown told John Tebbs about her 
conversation with McKneely. Id. McKneely had told her that he felt guilty 
and wanted to "come clean." T6:211. He told her that Defendant had used 
checks written for construction on two LaScala lots to pay off work done on 
McKneely's Green Springs home. T6:211. The payments were "in lieu of a 
debt" that Defendant owed to McKneely. Id. 
After talking to Bown, John called Defendant and told him to come to 
Salt Lake City immediately. T6:214. On August 11, 2005, Defendant met 
with Clement and John Tebbs, Jolie Bown, Greg Adamson, and Bonneville 
project assistant Julie Call to try to find out what happened to the money 
drawn on BACT. T6:66, 149. At that meeting, John confronted Defendant 
with Jolie's report of McKneely' s visit and admissions. T6:212. John 
accused Defendant of fraud. Id. Defendant said he was "really, really 
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sorry." Id. He said he thought he could sell McKneely' s home, make some 
1noney on the joint venture homes, and pay off the 1noney he had taken. Id. 
Defendant did not claim that Clement had given him permission to 
use the money for debts on McKneely's home. T6:216-17. He did not clailn 
that he and Clement Tebbs had an agreement allowing him to the use the 
money drawn for the joint venture homes for his personal expenses. T6:213. 
He did not refer to "anything in writing that would allow him to do what he 
did." 2 Id. Rather, he admitted the diversions, apologized, and agreed to try 
to "right his wrong." T6:217-19. 
Jolie and Greg Ada1nson met with Defendant again on October 24, 
2005, and Defendant told them that he had spent $776,783 drawn from 
BACT for the following purposes: $200,000 went to pay off debts, liens, and 
old bills associated with projects in which BACT had no interest; $130,000 
went to regain Defendant's Utah contractor's license; and $446,783 went to 
Defendant's personal use. T6:96; State's Trial Ex. 16. Defendant did not say 
2 Tebbs did lend Defendant $21,111.00 in July 2005. See State's Tr. Ex. 
6 ("Memorandum of Obligation"). Tebb provided the funds in checks made 
directly from BACT to Defendant's creditors. See id. He also had Defendant 
sign for and agree to repay the loan with interest from the first proceeds 
Defendant received from the project profits. The loan was separate from the 
money Tebbs provided to consh·uct the joint venture homes and was not the 
subject of any charge in this case. See id.; see also T4:118. 
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in the October 24 meeting that Clement Tebbs had allowed him to use the 
money for personal expenses or that he and Clement had an agreement 
allowing him to take the money in the way that he did. T6:93. Jolie and 
Ada1nson prepared and signed a memo to Clement and John Tebbs 
detailing Defendant's admissions. T6:97; State's Trial Ex. 16. 
Defendant's version. At trial, Defendant testified that Clement had 
authorized the diversions. TB:79-82 (referencing State's Tr. Ex. 17; 
Defendant's Tr. Ex. 31). Defendant also presented a document allegedly 
signed by Clement agreeing to advance Defendant the funds needed to 
cover his personal expenses until the first closing. See State's Tr. Ex. 17; 
Defendant's Tr. Ex. 31 (with extra page). 
At neither the August 11 nor the October 24 meeting did Defendant 
show anyone the document in State's Tr. Ex. 17, allegedly signed by 
Clement Tebbs, stating that BACT would cover his personal expenses until 
the first home sold. T6:93-94. Gordon Summers, DOPL investigator, 
testified that the signature on the document appeared to have been "cut and 
pasted."3 T7:31. 
3 State Trial Exhibit 17 was allegedly a joint venture agreement signed 
by Defendant and Clement Tebbs. The third paragraph of the agreement 
provided that BACT would advance Defendant funds to cover his personal 
(continued on next page) 
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B. Summary of proceedings. 
The Salt Lake District Attorney's Office charged Defendant with eight 
counts of communications fraud and one count of pattern of unlawful 
activity. R19, 272. After Defendant repeatedly failed to attend pre-trial 
proceedings, allegedly because of his poor health as a paraplegic, the trial 
was h·ansferred to St. George, where Defendant lived and could more easily 
attend. R102-03; see also R70, 73, 74-76, 78-79, 80-81, 85-86. 
Deposition of Clement Tebbs. Eighty-year-old Clement Tebbs lived 
in or near Salt Lake City. He was also in poor health, suffering from 
diabetes, cancer, and esophageal constriction. R390. His esophageal 
constriction required that he remain within four hours of his physician at 
the University of Utah Medical Center in Salt Lake City. Id. Thus, he could 
not travel to St. George for any future trial in Defendant's case. R391. 
expenses until the first closing on the joint venture properties. Clement 
Tebbs testified at his deposition that he had never seen the document and 
would never have agreed to. While the signature looked like his signature, 
it was not. See State Tr. Ex. 24 (Clen1ent Tebbs' Deposition) at 35-36 
(referring to Deposition Ex. 7, which is also the State's Trial Exhibit 17). 
Defendants Trial Exhibit 31 was the same as State's Trial Exhibit 17, 
but had a second page. The signature on the second page, which Defendant 
claimed to be that of Clement Tebbs, appears to be an exact duplicate of the 
signature on the first page-the signature that Gordon Summers testified 
appeared to have been "cut and pasted." T7:31. 
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The State therefore applied under rule 14(a)(8), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, for an order that Clen1ent be exa1nined by deposition 
in Murray, Utah on April 20, 2012. R388, 391. In the application, the State 
noted that if Defendant should assert that his health would prohibit his 
traveling to Murray, the deposition could take place at Fillmore.4 R391-92. 
Defendant objected to the State's application, arguing that a deposition 
would not satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause. R395. He 
asserted that cross-examination "in person or by videoconference allows the 
factfinder to observe subtleties of demeanor ... as the attorneys ask 
questions." Id. He asked that Clement testify in person at trial or by 
videoconference. Id. 396. Alternatively, he asked that the date of the 
deposition be postponed to allow him more time to prepare. Id. 397. 
The State replied that it needed to preserve Clement's testimony in 
case his health further deteriorated. R400. But the State agreed to have the 
deposition videotaped and transcribed. Id. In addition, the State agreed 
4 The driving distance from Salt Lake City to St. George is about 300 
miles. The distance from Salt Lake City to Fillmore is about 144 1niles and 
from Fillmore to St. George is about 159 1niles. See travelmath.cmn. Thus, 
Fillmore is about halfway between Salt Lake City ( or Murray) and St. 
George. 
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that Clement could testify by videoconference at trial if he was physically 
able at that time. Id. 
On May 24, 2012, the trial court granted the State's application, 
ordered the deposition taken on June 14, 2012 at Utah Attorney General's 
Murray office, and ordered that Defendant "appear at the deposition either 
in person or by electronic/video transmission." R415-16. The court thereby 
granted the extension of time Defendant had requested. The order was 
served on Defendant's then trial counsel, Arie Cramer. R417. The 
prosecutor arranged for a videographer and court reporter to attend the 
deposition. T18:22-23. 
Cramer's investigator, Brooke Karrington, spoke with Defendant on 
June 8 about "next week[']s deposition." T18:105. When Karrington talked 
to Defendant again on June 10 or 11 about the upcoming deposition, 
Defendant told her he would not be able to travel to Murray because of his 
physical limitations. T18:110. Karrington talked to him about other options 
for him to participate in the deposition, such as through Skype or 
videoconferencing. T18:98, 110. Defendant said for the first time, "Oh, by 
the way, I've been subpoenaed just now to appear in this ... arbitration 
hearing." T18:110. 
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Karrington asked Defendant for a copy of his subpoena to attend the 
arbitration matter, because counsel would need proof that Defendant had to 
be elsewhere in order to change the date of the deposition. T18:108. 
Karrington also asked Defendant to phone the attorney who had 
subpoenaed him in the arbitration matter to see if the attorney could work 
around his deposition schedule. Id. Defendant did not provide Karrington 
with the subpoena before or after the deposition. Tl8:104-05. And nothing 
suggests that he tried to contact the arbitration attorney to reschedule the 
date of the arbitration hearing. See T18:104-110. 
Counsel Arie Cramer therefore appeared at the deposition and cross-
examined Clement in Defendant's absence. T18:61. As explained, in the 
deposition Clement testified that he did not authorize Defendant to divert 
funds provided for consh·uction on the joint venture lots to pay personal 
expenses or for any other purposes. State's Tr. Ex. 24:32. 
Clement's deposition was later admitted and played at trial. T4:116, 
120. John Tebbs, Jolie Bohn, and Greg Adamson also testified at trial. Each 
of them testified that in the August 11, 2006 1neeting, Defendant admitted to 
Clement Tebbs that he had taken the money, apologized, and promised to 
return it. T6:68, 150, 212, 217. They each further testified that Defendant 
made no clain1 in that meeting that Clement had authorized Defendant to 
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use the money for other purposes. T6:93, 150-51, 219. Bown and Adamson 
testified that Defendant did not show them any document in which 
Clen1ent agreed to pay for Defendant's personal expenses. T6:94, 150-51 
(both referencing State's Tr. Ex. 17) 
John Grealish, a witness who had been Defendant's partner in the 
joint venture agreements with Clement Tebbs, but had not been present at 
the August 11 meeting, also testified at trial. T4:47-50. Grealish testified 
that none of the BACT financing was to be used "outside the specific costs" 
required for the construction - no money was to be "moved around," used 
to get Defendant's contractor's license back, given to Leonard McKneely or 
his company, or used for construction of the home McKneely was building 
in the St. George Green Springs neighborhood. T4:63-64. 
Judgment. Defendant was convicted of eight counts of communi-
cations fraud and one count of pattern of unlawful activity. R1019-21. He 
was sentenced to nine concurrent one- to fifteen-year prison terms and 
ordered to pay restitution of $776,783. Id. 
Motion for a new trial. Defendant filed a timely motion for a new 
trial, arguing that he was involuntarily absent from the Clement Tebbs 
deposition and asserting that admitting the deposition at trial violated his 
confrontation rights. R1031-46; see also R1019-21. He claimed that he had 
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been subpoenaed to testify at an arbitration matter in St. George on the 
same day. R1033-34. He also asserted that he did not learn about the 
deposition until June 12, 2012, and that he was too disabled to make the trip 
without resting two days before driving to Salt Lake City. R1033. 
Defendant also claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to 
admission of the deposition at trial. R1044. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that 
Defendant was voluntarily absent from the deposition and concluded that 
defense counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to its admission at trial. 
R1136-37. The court then denied Defendant's new trial motion. R1129-37. 
Appeal. On appeal, Defendant reasserts his motion-for-new-h·ial 
argument that his deposition absence was involuntary and that trial counsel 
was ineffective for not moving to exclude the deposition at trial. Br.Aplt. 
19-32. He also argues for the first time that because he had been subject to 
administrative sanctions and a civil lawsuit for his conduct, his criminal 
prosecution violated his double jeopardy rights. Id. 13-19. He also vaguely 
suggests that some additional error occurred. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his new h·ial 
1notion, reasserting that he was involuntarily absent at Clement Tebbs' 
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deposition and that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to exclude 
the deposition at h·ial. But Defendant has not challenged that h·ial court's 
bases for the ruling. Nor has he shown that the court's factual findings 
supporting its ruling were clearly erroneous. In any event, the evidence 
supports both the trial court's findings and its ruling. 
2. Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred for not 
dismissing his prosecution as a violation of double jeopardy. First, 
Defendant claims that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes his 
prosecution because he was previously subject to administrative sanctions 
for his conduct. But the ad1ninistrative sanctions were for contracting 
without a license in 2003, not diverting BACT's money in 2005. 
Alternatively, Defendant claims that his prosecution is precluded 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause because BACT sued him civilly for his 
conduct. But Defendant does not tie the lawsuit to the conduct for which he 
was criminally prosecuted in this case. In any event, double jeopardy 
protects only against multiple criminal prosecutions or punishments for the 
same conduct. And Defendant cites no legal authority holding that a 
private civil lawsuit constitutes a criminal punishment or prosecution. 
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3. Defendant vaguely suggests that some other error may have 
occurred. Defendant has not adequately identified that error or adequately 
briefed any claims related to it. This Court should not reach those claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE NE\A/ TRIAL 
MOTION, WHERE ADMITTING THE CHALLENGED 
DEPOSITION WAS NEITHER ERROR NOR PREJUDICIAL 
Following his conviction, Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing 
that he was involuntarily absent from Clement Tebbs' deposition. R1033-34. 
He argued that admitting the deposition therefore violated his 
confrontation rights and that trial counsel should have objected to it. R1034. 
The trial court denied the motion, finding that Defendant was voluntarily 
absent from the deposition. Rl 136. The court found that Defendant's 
testimony that he had a conflicting arbitration hearing was not credible. 
R1133. The court also found that Defendant's testimony that his health 
prevented his attending the hearing was not credible. Rl 135. The court 
further ruled that even if Defendant absence was not knowing and 
voluntary, Defendant had not shown that, based on the information 
available to trial counsel, counsel should have moved to exclude the 
deposition. Rl 136-37. Defendant now challenges the trial court's denial of 
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his new trial motion. But Defendant has not attempted to show why the 
trial court clearly erred in finding that his absence was voluntary. Nor has 
Defendant attempted to show why counsel should have 1noved to exclude 
the deposition where Defendant had not told counsel that he was 
involuntarily absent from it. 
A. This Court should not reach Defendant's claims that his 
deposition absence was voluntary and that reasonable 
counsel would have objected to admitting the deposition at 
trial. 
An appellant contesting a h·ial court's ruling must challenge all the 
bases for that ruling. If he does not, this Court will not address the 
appellant's claim. See State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, if 10, 318 P.3d 238 
(rejecting challenge to trial court's evidentiary ruling because defendant 
failed to challenge the basis of that ruling); Golden Meadows Props., LC v. 
Strand, 2010 UT App 257, if17, 241 P.3d 375 (rejecting claim that district 
court erred in striking affidavits, where party "fail[ed] to attack the district 
court's reasons" for striking the1n). Here, Defendant has not addressed, 
1nuch less challenged, the bases for the trial court's ruling or explained why 
the underlying factual findings are clearly erroneous. See Br.Aplt. 12. 
Accordingly, this Court should not review his claim. 
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B. Defendant has not adequately briefed this claim. 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
argu1nents that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
304 (Utah 1998). The rules of appellate procedure require the argument 
section of a brief to contain "the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing 
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). An 
appellant may not just baldly cite authority, but must develop that authority 
and provide "reasoned analysis based on that authority." Thomas, 961 P.2d 
at 305. 
Defendant has not done that. His brief has almost no record cites. See 
Br.Aplt. 5-37 (citing record only on pages 23-25, where Defendant addresses 
other issues). And while Defendant cites some minimal legal authority, he 
provides no reasoned analysis based on that authority. See Br.Aplt. 10-11. 
Moreover, Defendant has not marshaled the evidence supporting the 
trial court's finding that Defendant voluntarily absented hhnself fro1n 
Clement Tebbs' deposition. To properly challenge a fact finding on appeal, 
an appellant must "marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The appellant must then 
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"show that despite the supporting facts and in light of the conflicting 
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Hodgson 
v. Farmington City, 2014 UT App 188, ,I13, 334 P.3d 484 (quotations and 
citation omitted). A "party who fails to identify and deal with supportive 
evidence will never persuade an appellate court to reverse under the 
deferential standard of review that applies to such issues." State v. Nielsen, 
2014 UT 10, ,I40, 326 P.3d 645. 
Defendant has not marshaled the evidence supporting the trial court's 
finding that he was not credible in claiming that he had an arbitration 
hearing that conflicted with the deposition. R1133. Defendant also has not 
marshaled the evidence supporting the h·ial court's finding that he was not 
credible in claiming that his health prevented his appearance at the 
deposition. R1135. Defendant does not reference the supporting evidence, 
much less show that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
C. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant's 
absence from the deposition was voluntary. 
Defendant has not met his burden to set forth the law governing 
whether a defendant's absence from a deposition or any other proceeding is 
voluntary. That, by itself, defeats his claim. 
Assuming for purposes of argument that the standard that governs 
absences from h·ial and sentencing also governs absences from depositions, 
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Defendant has not shown that the h·ial court clearly erred in finding that his 
absence fron1 the deposition was voluntary. Before finding a defendant 
voluntarily absent at h·ial or sentencing, a court must find that the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present. The 
court cannot presume that a defendant is voluntarily absent simply because 
he has notice, but does not appear. State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, if15, 79 
P.3d 937. Rather, the court must make some inquiry about why the 
defendant might be absent. Id. The "question of voluntariness is highly fact-
dependent, is tied to the totality of circumstances in particular cases, and, 
where there is virtually no explanation for an absence, requires some form 
of inquiry by the trial court." Id. Once "inquiry appropriate to the case has 
been made, and a compelling reason for defendant's absence remains 
unknown, voluntariness ... may then be properly inferred." Id. (citation 
and quotation omitted). Whether a defendant is voluntarily absent is a 
question of fact. State v. Pando, 2005 UT App 384, if 13, 122 P.3d 672. Thus, 
review is for clear error. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, if20. 
Here, the trial court engaged in an inquiry appropriate to the case 
when the court took evidence on the voluntariness of Defendant's 
deposition absence at the evidentiary hearing on Defendant's new trial 
111otion. T18:4-180. Although the record strongly suggested that Cramer, 
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his counsel, and Karrington, counsel's investigator ( collectively "counsel" or 
"defense counsel"), both notified Defendant of the June 14 deposition date 
some time in late May or early June, see T18:59-60, 87-88, the trial court 
found for purposes of its ruling that Defendant received notice on June 12, 
2012, Rl 132. 
The trial court nevertheless found that Defendant was voluntarily 
absent. First, Defendant did not provide a copy of his arbitration hearing 
subpoena to defense counsel before the deposition. Rl 132. Thus, counsel 
was unable to verify Defendant's scheduling conflict or request that the 
deposition be continued based on Defendant's obligations to attend the 
arbitration hearing. Id. Second, the subpoena did not, in fact, require 
Defendant to be present at the arbitration hearing on June 14, the day of the 
deposition, but rather on June 15, the following day. Id.; see State's Evid. 
Hear. Ex. 6 (Affidavit of D. T. Needham), at Ex. 3. Moreover, despite 
Defendant's allegation that someone from the arbitration attorney's law 
office told him by telephone to be present on June 13 and 14 and despite 
Defendant's allegation that he was at the arbitration attorney's office on 
those days, Defendant did not present any evidence to support the 
allegations. Rl 132-33. 
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The court further found that Defendant did not send his counsel a 
copy of the subpoena because he knew that the subpoena did not require 
him to be present for the arbitration matter on June 14, the day of the 
deposition. Id. The court also found that Defendant's claim that he was 
required to be at the arbitration attorney's office on June 13 and 14 was not 
credible. Rl 133. The court then concluded that Defendant's obligation with 
respect to the arbih·ation hearing did not prevent his being present at the· 
deposition. Id. 
The court also found that Defendant's health did not prevent his 
attending the deposition. The court acknowledged that Defendant is a 
paraplegic. Rl 134. The court also noted that Defendant presented his 
physician's letter listing Defendant's medical conditions. Rl 135. But 
Defendant claimed that he could not travel the distance to or from Salt Lake 
City on successive days, and the doctor's letter said nothing about 
Defendant's ability to travel. Id. Thus, Defendant's state1nent that he could 
not make the h·ip was the only evidence on that matter.5 Id. But Defendant 
gave self-conh·adictory statements on several matters and the court found 
5 The 1notion court noted that the parties stipulated that Defendant's 
mother would testify that long h·ips increased Defendant's pain and sapped 
his energy. R1135 (referencing T18:179). 
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him to be untruthful about other matters, including whether defense 
counsel had suggested that Defendant attend the deposition through 
videoconferencing. Id. The court therefore did not credit Defendant's 
testimony and found, based on all the testimony, that Defendant's medical 
conditions did not prevent his h·aveling to the deposition. Id. The court 
also found that Defendant had made no effort to arrange for alternative 
transportation, such as airline flights or travel in a vehicle where Defendant 
could recline or lie down, that could have made his travel to Murray more 
manageable. R1136. 
The h·ial court concluded that Defendant "chose not to attend in the 
belief that the deposition would not go forward in his absence." Id. "He 
was aware of the fragile health of Mr. Tebbs and sought to delay the date 
for the deposition to a date that Mr. Tebbs may not have been available to 
give testimony." Id. Accordingly, the court found that Defendant was able 
to travel to Salt Lake to attend the deposition on June 14, 2012, and that his 
absence was voluntary. R1136. 
The trial court's findings were supported by the testimony of 
Defendant's counsel, Arie Cramer, and Cramer's investigator, Brooke 
Karrington. See T18:55-78, 81-118. The trial court acted within its discretion 
in ruling that the State had met its burden to prove that Defendant 
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"knowingly and voluntarily absented himself fr01n the deposition." Rl 136. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it ruled that by voluntarily 
absenting himself, Defendant "waived his right to be present and confront 
Mr. Tebbs during his testimony." Id. 
D. Defendant has not shown that the trial court clearly erred 
when it found that at the time of trial, trial counsel had no 
reason to believe that Defendant's absence was involuntary 
and therefore no reason to object to the deposition. 
Moreover, while Defendant clain1ed in his new trial motion that his 
absence from the deposition was involuntary, he admitted that he did not 
tell his trial counsel that he was unable to attend the deposition before the 
State played the deposition video at h·ial. Accordingly, counsel did not 
object to admission of the video. 
1. Additional facts. 
Before trial, Douglas Terry replaced Arie Cran1er as Defendant's 
counsel. He did not object to the trial court's admitting the deposition at 
trial. 
Defendant argued for the first time in his new trial motion that 
because his absence at the deposition was involuntary, trial counsel should 
have objected to admitting the deposition as a violation of Defendant's 
confrontation rights. R1040-41. But in an affidavit supporting his new trial 
motion, Defendant stated that at the tilne of h·ial he had talked to his then 
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trial counsel, Doug Terry, about the use of the deposition. 
Defendant also stated that based on those discussions, he did not believe 
that "Mr. Terry was aware that the deposition had been scheduled at a time 
when I could not be present .... " Defendant's Evid. Hear. Ex. 7, pp. 3-4, 
,r,rs-6. 
Also, during Defendant's testimony at the new trial hearing, the 
prosecutor asked hhn on cross-exa1nination, "[Y]ou never told Doug Terry 
anything about thinking that the date [ of the scheduled deposition] was a 
different day ... ?" T18:165. Defendant responded, "Doug Terry and I never 
talked about it." Id. Asked again, "You never told him, yes or no?" 
Defendant responded, "He never asked me." Id. The prosecutor asked 
again, "[A]nd it's your testimony that you never told Doug Terry why you 
missed the deposition because he simply didn't ask?" T18:166. Defendant 
responded, 'Tin not an attorney." Id. 
2. Given Defendant's concession that he did not tell trial 
counsel that he was unable to attend the deposition, 
Defendant has not shown that trial counsel should have 
objected to admission of the deposition at trial. 
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel Defendant must show 
"first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
den1onsh·able 1nanner, which perfonnance fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judg1nent and, second, that . . . counsel's 
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performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, if 14, 361 
P.3d 104, 109-10 (citation and quotation omitted). "The reasonableness of 
counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the 
defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, 
quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on 
information supplied by the defendant." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 691 (1984). 
Here, the trial court found that from the time of Clement Tebb' s 
deposition, Defendant "possessed all of the information which would have 
given Mr. Terry grounds to object to the introduction of the Tebbs 
deposition." Rl 137. But Defendant "failed to provide this information to 
trial counsel. Without this information, trial counsel had no basis to object." 
Id. 
Defendant has not addressed the trial court's ruling, let alone 
challenged the findings supporting it. Thus, he has not shown that the h 4 ial 
court erred in rejecting his ineffective assistance claim and in denying his 
new trial motion. See Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, ,Il0. 
Moreover, while not addressed by the trial court, h 4 ial counsel had a 
second strategic reason not to object to the admission of Clement's 
deposition testimony. As trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing 
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on the new trial motion, he did not "necessarily wanted Clem Tebbs in trial 
as a live witness." T18:43. Asked if he was concerned that Clement "would 
come across as compassionate or as sympathetic," trial counsel stated, "I 
was concerned that it ... wouldn't be any better ... for our case, for 
[Clement] to be there live and definitely could be 1nuch better for the State 
to have him there live." T18:43-44. 
Thus, counsel's not objecting to the deposition was also strategically 
reasonable. Trial counsel could reasonably have determined that having 
Clement testify in person would have emphasized to the jurors - to 
Defendant's detriment-that the victhn in this case was elderly and 
suffering from serious health problems. That could have undermined the 
sympathy the jurors might otherwise have had for Defendant's disabilities 
and any disposition they may have had to judge him less harshly because of 
his disabilities. 
In sum, Defendant has not shown that the trial court erred in 
concluding that defense counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to 
admission of Cle1nent' s deposition. 
E. In any event, admission of the deposition at trial was 
harmless. 
Finally, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's new trial 
motion because admitting Clement's deposition at trial was harmless 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
The central issue in the case was not whether Defendant diverted BACT' s 
funds for his personal use, but whether Clement Tebbs had authorized 
Defendant to do so. See Rl 130. Clement Tebbs testified in his deposition 
that he did not. State's Tr. Ex. 24:32. But four additional witnesses 
independently testified to the same thing. T7:63-64; T6:68, 150, 212. They 
testified that Clement had not authorized the diversion of the BACT funds. 
Id. Three of those four witnesses were present in an August 11, 2005 
meeting where Clement confronted Defendant about diverting the funds. 
T6:66. All three of them testified that Defendant admitted to taking BACT 
funds for other purposes and apologized. T6:68, 150, 212. All of them 
testified that Defendant made no claim that Clement had authorized the 
diversions. T6:93, 150-51, 213. And all of them testified that Defendant, 
when accused, did not claim the existence of an agreement authorizing the 
diversion of the funds. 6 T6:93, 150-51, 213. Although not present at the 
6 In convicting, the jury necessarily found that the letter allegedly 
authorizing Defendant to use BACT money for his personal expenses, 
purportedly signed by Tebbs, was a forgery. See State's Trial Ex. 17; 
Defendant's Trial Ex. 31. As explained, three witnesses other than Tebbs 
testified that Defendant never referenced the document in the August 11, 
2005 meeting. See also T7:31 (Gordon Summers, DOPL investigator, 
( continued on next page) 
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August 11 meeting, the fourth witness, John Grealish, also testified none of 
the BACT financing was to be used II outside the specific costs" required for 
the construction- no money was to be II moved around," used to get 
Defendant's contractor's license back, given to Leonard McKneely or his 
company, or used for construction of the home McKneely was building in 
the St. George Green Springs neighborhood. T4:63-64. 
Thus, even without Cle1nent' s deposition testimony, the evidence of 
Defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Under these circumstances, any error 
in admitting Clement's deposition was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's new 
h·ial motion. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT PLAINLY ERRED FOR NOT DISMISSING THE 
STATE'S PROSECUTION ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
GROUNDS 
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it failed to 
sua sponte dismiss his charges under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Br.Aplt. 
at 6. Defendant's argument is unclear. He apparently believes that his 
criminal prosecution violated double jeopardy (1) because the Utah Division 
testifying that Tebbs' signature on the docmnent appeared to have been 
"cut and pasted"). 
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of Occupational and Professional Licensing (DOPL) had earlier investigated 
and sanctioned him for conh·acting without a license and allegedly 
acquitted him of all charges in Nove1nber 2007 and/ or (2) because BACT 
had brought a civil case against him that resulted in the release of a lis 
pendens. See Br.Aplt. 5-7, 13-19. In making this argument, Defendant 
references the trial testimony of DOPL auditor Kim Quach. See Br.Aplt. 5-6. 
But Defendant has provided no page number, and the State can find no 
reference in Kim Quach' s trial testimony to an acquittal of any charges in 
November 2007. 
A. This court should not reach Def end ant's unpreserved claim 
because he has not argued plain error. 
Defendant has not argued and the State has not found that Defendant 
preserved this claim below. This Court will decline to review an 
unpreserved issue where a defendant does not argue that "exceptional 
circumstances" or "plain error" justifies its review. See State v. Pledger, 896 
P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
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Here, Defendant has not argued either exceptional circumstances or 
plain error. See Br.Aplt. 13-19. 7 Thus, this Court should not review his 
double jeopardy claim. 
B. Defendant has not adequately briefed this claim. 
This Court also need not consider Defendant's claim because it is 
inadequately briefed. Specifically, Defendant cites no authority applying 
the Double Jeopardy Clause to criminal prosecutions following 
administrative sanctions or civil cases. An II appellate court is not ✓ a 
depository in which [a party] may dump the burden of argument and 
research."' Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, if9, 194 P.3d 903 (citation omitted). 
When a party does nothing more than II cursorily" raise an issue, this Court 
should II decline[ ] to address" it on appeal. State v. Arave, 2009 UT App 278, 
,I12 n.3, 220 P.3d 182, rev'd on other grounds, 268 P.3d 163 (Utah 2011); see also 
State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, ~11, 108 P.3d 710 CA brief which does not fully 
identify, analyze, and cite its legal arguments may be disregarded or 
stricken by the court.") (citation and quotation omitted). 
7 Defendant mentions "plain error" three times in his brief, but not to 
argue that the trial court plainly erred for not sua sponte dismissing the 
prosecution. See Br.Aplt. 16, 18. More significantly, he does not set forth 
what Defendant must show to establish plain error, 1nuch less attempt to 




C. Because the prosecution in this case was not for the same 
conduct as the DOPL sanctions, Defendant has not shown a 
double jeopardy violation. 
In any event, Defendant has not shown that the prosecution in this 
case is for the same conduct addressed and sanction by DOPL. 
1. Additional facts. 
Kim Quach did testify at Defendant's trial. T7:2-20. She testified that 
in 2005 she was given Defendant's audit file frmn a previous investigator. 
T7:3. She stated that Defendant had been a licensed contractor, but that his 
license expired in July 2003 .for failure to renew. T7:4. He later entered into 
a stipulation with DOPL acknowledging that between August 1, 2003, and 
August 26, 2003, he "acted as a contractor without a current license." State's 
Tr. Ex. 19 at 2. He was then issued a citation, which included a $200 fine 
and a cease-and-desist order. T7:6; State's Tr. Ex. 19 at p.2-3. 
Defendant also stipulated that on September 22, 2003, his employees 
were found working on a site even though Defendant was not then licensed. 
State's Tr. Ex. 19 at p.3. Defendant was issued another citation, which 
included a $600 fine and a cease-and-desist order. Id. 
Defendant then stipulated that on October 23, 2003, his employees 
were again found working on a site even though Defendant was not then 
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licensed. Id. Following this violation, the Santa Clara City building 
inspector issued Defendant a stop-work order. Id. 
Finally, Defendant stipulated that he had engaged in unlicensed 
contracting between August 1 and August 31, 2003. Id.; T7:6. DOPL fined 
him $60,000, but agreed to stay $57,000 of the fine if Defendant paid $3000 
of the fine within thirty days of the stipulation. T7:6. Defendant did not 
timely pay the $3000. Id. As a result, Defendant had to pay the $60,000 fine 
with interest. T6:9. Defendant regained his license in Septe1nber 2005. 
TS:133. 
2. Defendant has not demonstrated that DOPL's sanctions 
for contracting without a license in 2003 required 
dismissal of his criminal charges. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person shall "be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. 
amend. V ( emphasis added). Defendant apparently asserts that he was put 
in jeopardy for the first time when DOPL sanctioned him for contracting 
without a license in 2003. 
But the Double Jeopardy Clause protects "only against the imposition 
of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense." Hudson v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (emphasis in Hudson) (citation omitted). Even if 
Defendant were being punished for the same conduct for which he was 
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ad1ninistratively sanctioned, he would likely have a difficult time showing 
that DOPL's administrative sanctions were "criminal punishments" for 
purposes of double jeopardy. See id.; see also State v. Bushman, 2010 UT App 
120, 231 P.3d 833 (holding that adminish·ative fine did not constitute 
criminal punishment or trigger double jeopardy protections). Defendant 
has not attempted to do so. 
Even assmning for purposes of argument that contracting without a 
license is a criminal offense, it was not the "same offense" as that for which 
Defendant was prosecuted in this case. Defendant was sanctioned by DOPL 
for conh·acting without a license in 2003. State's Ex. 19 (Stipulation and 
Order, DOPL-2003-230). The charges in this case stem from Defendant's 
diverting BACT' s funds from March 2005 to June 2005. State Tr. Ex. 7-13. 
Thus, Defendant has not established error, much less obvious and 
harmful error, in the trial court's not sua sponte dismissing the prosecution 
of this criminal case as a violation of double jeopardy based on Defendant's 
DOPL proceedings. 
D. Defendant has not demonstrated that BACT's civil suit 
against him required dismissal of his criminal charges. 
Alternatively, Defendant argues that a civil suit by BACT required the 
trial court to dismiss this prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Defendant claims that on October 31, 2006, BACT (Clement Tebbs) filed a 
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lawsuit against him for approximately $800,000 and a lis pendens (a notice 
that property is the subject of legal action) on eighteen properties worth 
seven million dollars. Br.Aplt. 5, 15 (referencing case no. 060501877) 
(Docket reproduced in Addendu1n C). He further claims that on Nove1nber 
30, 2006, his attorney filed for a release of the lis pendens and that the 
district court ordered the release in December 2006. Br.Aplt. 15-16. 
Defendant apparently believes that BACT' s filing the lawsuit placed him in 
jeopardy and/ or that the court's release of the lis pendens was equivalent to 
an acquittal of wrongdoing. 
Defendant, however, points to no authority holding that a civil action 
between two private parties to resolve a conh·act dispute places either party 
in jeopardy for purposes of double jeopardy. See Br.Aplt. 13-19. Nor does 
Defendant point to any holding that the release of a lis pendens acts as an 
acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. See id. Defendant's failure to cite 
such authority defeats his plain error claims. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 
239 (Utah App. 1997) (error is not obvious when "there is no settled 
appellate law to guide the trial court"). 
Thus, Defendant has not shown that the trial court plainly erred in 




THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED CLAIMS OF UNCLEARLY 
SPECIFIED ERROR 
Defendant suggests that other errors occurred. But Defendant does 
not clearly specify the errors nor adequately brief his claims with respect to 
them. This Court therefore should not reach them. 
A. Defendant has not adequately identified any other error or 
adequately briefed any other claim. 
Defendant suggests that the prosecution withheld exculpatory 
evidence. See Br.Aplt. 6. Defendant has not adequately identified what 
exculpatory evidence was withheld. Even assuming for purposes of 
argument that he had identified that evidence, he has cited no legal 
authority to support his claim, nor has he analyzed the facts in light of any 
relevant legal authority. Thus he has not adequately briefed his claims, and 
this Court should not review them. See Green, 2005 UT 9, ,Ill (" A brief 
which does not fully identify, analyze, and cite its legal arguments may be 
disregarded or stricken by the court.") (citation and quotation omitted). 
Defendant's inadequately briefed claims are not clear. The State 
responds to what Defendant's arguments might be, but only summarily. 
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B. No Btady error occurred. 
Defendant suggests that the State withheld exculpatory evidence of 
some kind. See Br.Aplt. 6 (referencing "filings ... withheld by [the] 
prosecution" apparently constituting "exculpatory material"). But 
Defendant has not established that error occurred or that, if it did, it was 
prejudicial. 
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and its progeny, the 
prosecution has a duty to disclose exculpatory information to the defense in 
criminal cases. This duty applies to both substantively exculpatory 
evidence and to evidence that may be used for impeachment. Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972)). Moreover, the prosecutor has a 
duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on behalf 
of the government and to disclose that evidence to the defense. Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). But evidence available to a defendant 
upon exercise of reasonable diligence does not support a Brady claim. See 
Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11 th Cir. 2002). No Brady violation occurs 
where the defendant reasonably should have known of the evidence, or 
where the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its advantage 
during trial but failed to do so." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, if 33, 37 P.3d 




establishes constitutional error. See Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 281 
(1999). Nondisclosure of favorable evidence constitutes a Brady violation 
"only if the evidence is material." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
Evidence is material under Brady only "' if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.111 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34 (citation 
omitted). "The mere possibilihJ that an item of undisclosed information might 
have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial does 
not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." State v. Nebeker, 657 
P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted) (emphasis altered). 
1. Withheld filings. 
As explained under Point II, above, Defendant asserts that DOPL 
renewed his contractor's license in 2007, allegedly after finding that he 
owed nothing to Clement Tebbs. Br.Aplt. 5-6. He apparently claims that 
DOPL' s action and a trial court's release of a lis pendens on one or more of 
his properties constituted acquittals in this case. See id. 
Defendant apparently argues that the State withheld the filings 
associated with the DOPL actions and the release of the lis pendens. See id. 
6. He states in his brief: "Both of these filing were withheld by the 
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prosecution ,, Id. Defendant requests that the court admit "the 
exculpatory material" alluded to in the trial. Id. 
But Defendant does not show that the evidence was not available to 
him upon the exercise of reasonable diligence or that he had no opportunity 
to use the evidence to its advantage during trial. The stipulation that 
provided the basis for DOPL' s suspending Defendant's contractor's license 
and imposing fines was produced at trial as State's Ex. 19. The Labor 
Con1mission documentation confirming that he had paid the penalties was 
produced at trial as State's Ex. 20. Kim Quach, DOPL auditor, testified to 
the matters included in the documents. T7-20. She also testified that 
Defendant's license was reinstated in Septe1nber 2005. T7:16. Thus, 
Defendant hd the opportunity to use this evidence to its advantage during 
trial. See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, iJ33. 
As to the release of the lis pendens, Defendant states in his own brief 
that his attorney filed for the release in November 30, 2006, and that the 
district court ordered the release in December 2006. Defendant thus should 
have had reasonable access to those docmnents. See Moon, 285 F.3d 1301 at 
1308. 
Moreover, Defendant does not show that the allegedly suppressed 
evidence was material, i.e., that it would have 1nade a difference in the 
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outcome of the h·ial. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34. Finally, nothing suggests 
that either the reinstatement of his license or the release of lis pendens 
would have established an acquittal of the charges in this criminal 
prosecution. 
In sum, Defendant has not shown a Brady violation based on withheld 
filings. 
2. John Grealish letter. 
a. Additional facts. 
Defendant also references a letter written by prosecutor Wade 
Farraway to federal judge Clark Waddoups on June 13, 2011, in connection 
with a federal case against John Grealish. Br.Aplt. 25. The letter asks Judge 
Waddoups to take into consideration Grealish's cooperation in making 
himself available to testify in the case against Defendant. See State's Evid. 
Hear. Ex. 1. 
In his new trial 1notion, Defendant claimed that the State withheld the 
letter and that it could have been used for impeachment. R1035-36. The 
trial court took evidence on that matter. The State presented the testimony 
of Scheree Wilcox, the paralegal who had worked with Farraway in 
preparing the letter. R18:ll. Wilcox testified that she asked Mr. Farraway 
whether a copy of the letter should be sent to defense counsel. Rl8:13. 
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When he said that she should send the letter, she 1nade a notation on the 
bottom of the letter, "Copy to Def. Atty. -Nathan Reeve," initialed the 
notation, copied the letter, and sent it to Mr. Reeve. R18:13. Nathan Reeve 
did not testify, but succeeding attorneys Arie Cramer and Douglas Terry 
did. They both testified that the letter was not in the file when they received 
it. See T18:33, 75. 
The trial court found the paralegal' s testimony that she mailed the 
letter credible. Rl 130. Without testimony from Mr. Reeve, however, the 
court could not determine whether Reeve received it. Id. But, the court 
held, whether the letter was received or not made no difference, given the 
evidence in this case. Id. For purposes of analyzing the Brady issue, the 
court therefore assumed that the letter was not mailed. Id. 
The court then denied the new trial motion on the basis that the 
defense's inability to cross-examine Grealish with the letter to Judge 
Waddoups made no difference in the trial result. T18:1131. The court noted 
that Defendant" did not contest that he had diverted funds to his own use." 
TlS:1130. "Therefore, the central issue was whether he had authority to do 
this." Id. And while Defendant claimed that he had been given that 
authority, "four witnesses testified that they were present" when Defendant 
ad1nitted "to using the funds without authority and apologized for doing 
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so." Id. Moreover, They testified that when confronted, Defendant" did not 
claim to have authority to divert the funds" or "make any reference to a 
document which granted him such authority." Id. The court also noted that 
Defendant's credibility had been called into question by testimony he gave 
that was refuted by a Nevada building official. Rl 131. 
The trial court accordingly concluded that the State's case was strong 
and the Defendant's weak. Id. "Based upon all the evidence presented at 
trial," the court found that there was no reasonable probability that the 
result would have been different had the defense been able to cross-examine 
Mr. Grealish with the letter. Id. 
b. Because Defendant has not acknowledged the trial 
court's ruling, much less challenged the factual 
findings upon which it is based, this Court should not 
review his claim that the prosecutor withheld an 
exculpatory letter. 
Defendant mentions the John Grealish letter in his brief of appellant. 
See Br.Aplt. at 25. Defendant asserts that if the letter was provided to 
counsel, counsel would have been "grossly insufficient" for not cross-
examining Grealish about it. Id. 26-26. But his purpose in mentioning the 
Grealish letter is apparently to show that the prosecutor "was in possession 
of the documents emailed to [Scheree] Wilcox." Id. 26. This claim is 
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unclear. Defendant has not explained what documents he is referencing or 
why they are in1portant to the case. The State therefore cannot respond. 
Defendant apparently is not challenging the trial court's denial of his 
new trial 1notion based on any Brady error. But if he is, he has not 
mentioned the trial court's ruling, nor challenged the factual findings upon 
which it was based. This Court should therefore not review the claim. See 
Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, if 10. 
And, in any case, nothing suggests that the trial court erred in 
concluding that, based on all the evidence presented at trial, any cross-
examination of Grealish on the basis of Wade Farroway's letter to Judge 
Waddoups would have made no difference in the outcome of the h~ial. 
Therefore, even assuming the letter was withheld, the letter did not 
constitute material evidence under Brady. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34 
(evidence material under Brady on if there is a reasonable probability that 
had evidence been disclosed, result of proceeding would have been 
different). 
Thus, Defendant has not established any Brady violation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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Respectfully submitted on February 26, 2016. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
IL Needham was wrongfully convicted of mme (8) counts of 
c01n1nunication fraud and (1) count of pattern of unlawful conduct. This 
case was first brought before the fifth district court - Washington County on 
October 31, 2006, Needham attorney responded to the civil suit for 
approximately $800,000.00 and the lis pendens filed on 18 properties owned 
by Needham on November 30, 2006. After review of sworn testimony and 
documentation admitted to the court, the lis pendens was realeased on all 
(18) eighteen properties i!1 Dece1nber 2006 in case no. 060501877. Affidavit. 
A complaint was filed at the Division of Professional Licensing in 
June 2006. Needham and counsel met with Wayne Holman of DOPL in 
September 2006 to admit sworn testimony and documentation. On 
November 2007, DOPL renewed Needham's license after a fourteen month 
investi-
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gation finding no financial obligation owed to Clement Tebbs. Kin1 Quon 
testimony at trial. The court and counsel have refused to provide day 4 and 
day 5 of the trial that contain Kim Quam testimony. 
Both of these filings were withheld by prosecution and appointed 
counsel that has been substantially and injurious to Needham in violation to 
due process. Needham respectfully request an opportunity to admit to the 
court the exculpatory material eluded to in the trial but never factually 
developed due to ineffective counsel. 
Claims of conformation clause, double jeopardy, ineffective assistance 
of counsel and their cumulative effect have been preserved on trial record. 
Claims of imminent danger exception, wrongful search and seizure 
and cruel and unusual punishment have not been 
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preserved in trial record or under rule 23B 1notion and affidavit. Needham 
will address these issues at the hearing to affirm the threats to life living 
under the conclusions at the State Prison of Draper. 
Ill. Related and or prior appeals 
There are no prior appeals. There is case no. 07150092 and 
20140658 and that represents a case that has been collaterally attacked by 
case no. 101500067 and 20140483-ca. The case no. 07150092 is a plea in 
abeyance that was violated by defendant by the wrongful conviction. 
IV. Other UT R. App P. 24(£) 
Given that defendant, Needham is proceeding pro se, Needham 
reserves the right to raise additional issues in his opening brief after full 
review of the record that the court or appellate counsel has yet to provide a 
full copy. 
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V. Standard of Appellate review (UT R. App. P. 24(a)(S): 
"Generally, we review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness 
according the trial court no particular deference." Wilson Supply Inc. v. 
Fradan Mfg Corp 2002 UT 94 ,Ill, 54 P.3d 1177 citing Orton v. Carter 970 P.2d 
1254, 1256 (UTAH 1998) also Newspaper Agency Corp v. Auditing Divi of State 
Tax Com 938 P.2d 266, 267 (UT 1997). Further, whether a trial court has 
properly interpreted and applied a statute is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. 
Standard of Appellate review (UT R. App. P. 24(a)(5): 
We review the trial courts imposition of sentence for an abuse of 
discreation. "State v. Winbelly, 2013 UT App 160, 916, 305 P.3d 1072 citing 
State. v. Killpack, 2008 UT App. 49, 9118, 191 P.3d 17 (explaining that an 
appellate court will overturn a sentencing decision only if it is clear that the 
actions of the trial court were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse 
of discretion. 
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This appeal is from a final judgement, sentence, order referring 
outstanding fine is the Office of Debt Collection, and commitment, defined 
more particularly post, of the Fifth District Court in and for Washington 
County, State of Utah. Defendant Aaron Needham (here in after 
"Needham") submits the following in accordance with the requirements set 
forth in Utah R. App. P. 24. 
VI. Appellate Jurisdiction (UT R. App. P. 24(c)(2): 
This court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
VH. Underlying Criminal Conviction (UT R. App. P.24 (c)(6) 
Judgement, sentence, order referring outstanding fine to the Office of 
Debt Collection, and commitment, filed June 5th, 2014 that Needham would 
serve nine concurrent terms of not less than one year and not more than 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
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VIII. Statement of Issues and Standard of Review Rule 24 (a)(S) 
UT R. App. P. Showing issues preserved in Trial Court 
A Motion for new trial generally is permitted for correction 
errors made in trial court or for reviewing a conviction obtained by unfair 
or unlawful 1nethods. "State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976, 978(UT App 1988). 
The Defendant, Needhain was denied his right to confront witnesses 
against him and his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
right of Confrontation is embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. The 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states 
through the fourteenth ainendment, provides that "in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against 
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Utah Const. Art I, § 12, emphasis added. The Utah Constitution expressly 
provides that the accused is entitled to an actual "face to face" 
confrontation. Sixth Amendment juris prudence establishes that the United 
States Constitution also requires such confrontation. See eq. U.S. v. Begay, 
937 P.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1991), holding that the confrontation clause provides 
defendants with both "the right to face physically" the governments 
wih1esses and the right of cross-examination). The rationale behind the face-
to-face rule is discussed in Coy v. Iowa, 987 U.S. 1012 rooted in the concept 
that it is exceedingly more difficult for a man to tell a lie while he is looking 
into the eyes of the one about whom he is talking. The Supreme Court 
stated: the Sixth Amendment quarantined face to face encounter between 
witness and accused serves ends related both to appearances and to reality. 
This 
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opinion is embellished with referenced to and quotations from antiquity in 
part to convey that there is something deep in human nature that regards 
face to face confrontation between accused and accuser as essential to a fair 
trial in a criminal prosecution "Pomter v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404(1965) 
In this case, due to the combination of Mr. Cramer's conduct which 
deprived Needham of the opportunity to be physically present at the 
deposition of Tebbs and Ms. Reid and Doug Terry's failure to object to the 
admission of Tebb' s deposition into evidence, Needham was entirely 
deprived of his rights to confront Tebbs face to face. This deprivation was 
deeply compounded by Crainer's failure to discuss or address the material 
and questions prepared by Needham in cross-examining Tebbs at the 
deposition, which Cramer was in possession same material given to 
Attorney General's Office. 
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III. Needhan1 was denied his rights under "Double Jeopardy-duel 
sovereignty protection that the Supreme Court has articulated policy 
justifications for each protection conferred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
The prohibition against second prosecution after acquittal conviction 
protect individuals from the continued embarrassment, anxiety and expense 
of second prosecution, while decreasing the risk of an erroneous conviction 
or an impermissibly enhanced sentence "Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-
99 (1989)" Double Jeopardy attached to hung counts that shared key 
elements with acquitted counts. U.S. v Caughlin, 610 P.3d 89, 96-98 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). Needham claims that the charges are conviction be judicated on 
grounds that double jeopardy attached in September 2006 when the 
Division of Professional (DOPL) began reviewing the sworn testimony, then 
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concluded that Needham had done no wrong and was acquitted of all 
charges in November 2007. This can be verified on court transcripts, Kim 
Quon of DOPL on p. Whether offense is lesser-included offense determined 
by textual comparison of statutory elements because such test lends itself to 
certain and predictable outcomes. "U.S. v. Carter, 530 U.S. 255, 260-61 (2000). 
Double Jeopardy clause prohibited successive prosecution by different 
sovereigns, sovereigns with lesser interest might proceed first and preclude 
prosecution by sovereigns with greater interest U.S. v. Rinaldi, 434 U.S. 22, 
28 (1977). Local governments are not considered sovereigns for double 
jeopardy purposes. Consequently, successive prosecutions by a local 
government and a state in which it is located, or by two local government in 
the same state are prohibited. "Georgetown law Journal P. 511(2013). 
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After dismissal of city's reckless driving charge, state prosecution for 
aggravated assault stemming from same incident barred by double 
jeopardy. "Abramson v. Griffen, 693 P.2d 1009, 1010-11 (10th Cir. 1982). Town 
barred from prosecution defendant for car theft following prosecution by 
another town for joy victim because charges constituted some offense 
"Brown v. Ohio, U.S. 1611, 169-70 (1977). The Supreme Court has suggested 
that federal and state or federal authorities 1nay not manipulate a system to 
achieve the equivalent of a second prosecution. Georgetown law journal 
2013 P. 511. Prosecution misrepresented to the court that DOPL's decision to 
renew Needham's license was to earlier in the investigation, when in fact it 
had been over a fourteen month period. In support of DOPL' s decision, 
Tebbs filed a lawsuit and Lis Pendens of eighteen properties worth seven 
million dollars on October 31, 2006. Needham's attorney, Brad Parson filed 
for release on 
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November 30, 2006. The Fifth District Court-Washington County in case no. 
060501877 order release of all properties with no financial obligation owed 
to BACT after reviewing documentation sub1nitted to DOPL in Septen1ber 
2006, in December 2006. 
The letter to DOPL and supporting documents were given to the 
Attorney General Office of State of Utah in 2006, 2008, 2011. Therefore, by 
with holding exculpatory material, the state was able to manipulate court 
proceedings affirming "sham prosecution". Several circuits have cited 
Bartkus and considered whether the sham prosecution exception exits or 
was applied in that case. Bartkus v. Ill 359 U.S. 121, 122-241 (1959). The court 
may vacate earlier findings of no prior jeopardy if new evidence at h 4 ial later 
supports reviewed motions, U.S. v. Stricklam, 591 P.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
Under plain error where defendant convicted of two crimes 
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on same facts in violation of the 5th amendment right to defree from 
duplicative prosecution and punishment, U.S. v. Jackson, 443 P.3d 293, 
301(3rd cir 2006). Even when a defendant failed to assert a double jeopardy 
clahn at the start of the h·ial, the claim is reviewable under a plain error 
standard. U.S. v. Tann, 577 P.3d 533-35 (3rd cir. 2009). Error that falls 
between structural and trial error is presumptively prejudicial, U.S. v. 
Harbim, 250 P.3d 532, 544 (7th cir. 2001). A structural discovery error occurs 
when the government with holds material evidence favorable to defendant. 
Brady v. Md, 373 U.S. 83, 87(1963). Evidence is material and requires reversal 
of conviction when there is a reasonable probability that disclosure would 
have altered the results of the trial, a mere possibility is not enough, U.S. v. 
Aqurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976). "Confrontation clause violation not 
harmless because jurors otherwise could 
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have found reasonable doubt on ele1nent of crimes, U.S. v. Santos, 449 P.3d 
93, 100 (2nd cir 2005). The claim reviewed for plain error because objection to 
admission of testimony from witness reviewed for plain error because claim 
not raised at trial, U.S. v. Ferguson, 676 P.3d 260, 281-82(2nd Cir. 2011). 
"Claims of prosecutorial misconduct reviewed for plain error because no 
objection made at trial." "Claim of prosecutorial misconduct preserved 
despite defendants failure to raise issue at trial because misconduct 
deprived defendant of real opportunity to object." U.S. v. Blueford, 312 P.3d 
962, 974 (9th Cir. 2000). Needham alleges prosecutorial misconduct and 
ineffective assistance of counsel with holding of exculpatory material and 
deceptive arraignments of scheduling of deposition, violated 
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double jeopardy-duel sovereignty protection and rights of confrontation 
clause. 
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The question of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the 
two part test set forth in, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688(1984). 
Assistance of counsei is ineffective if (1) counser s performance was 
deficient and, (2) the deficient perfonnance prejudiced the defense, State v. 
Eyre, 2008 UT 16 (UT 2008), quoting Strickland at 687. As to the first prena 
of Strickland the erroneousness of those errors is 1neasured by whether 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
ID a convicted defendant. ... must identify the acts or omissions of counsel 
that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional 
judgement. Id at 688. 
If counsel was unaware of the right to confrontation ramifi-
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cations as was said in one case where the attorney was unaware of the 
statute, then his decision not to cross examine the witness cannot be 
accorded the same presumption of reasonableness as is accorded most 
strategic decisions because it was not based on strategy but rather on a 
startling ignorance of the law, Ki111111elan v. MoJTison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986). 
It is clear that Mr. Cramer failed in his obligation to provide the defendant 
an opportunity to be present during Mr. Tebbs deposition further it is clear 
from the trial record that Mr. Tebbs, as the principal of BACT, was a key 
witness for the state. Without the testimony through his deposition, the 
government would have had little or no basis for prosecution. As such, his 
credibility was pivotal to the State's case. In some circumstances, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has found that ineffective assistance of 
counsel and prejudice there from are preserved. Such 
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circmnstances include (1) when there is a complete denial of counsel (2) 
when counsel entirely facts to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful 
adversarial testing and (3) where it is unlikely that any attorney could 
provide effective assistance under the circumstances, U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 
648, 659-60 (1984). In this case, Mr. Cramer did not subject Mr. Tebbs 
testimony at deposition to meaningful adversarial testing, because he did 
not prepare with defendant for the deposition to know appropriate avenues 
of cross-examination and his conduct prevented the defendant from 
attending the deposition, depriving Mr. Needham of right to face to face 
confrontation. Based solely on that factor, the assistance provided to 
Needha1n is presumed to be ineffective and prejudicial. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Terry and Ms. Reid failed to exercise 
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the slall, expertise, diligence and professional judgement of a reasonable 
attorney in failing to ascertain whether Mr. Needham had knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to confront Tebbs during the deposition. The 
Supreme Court has emphasized that the fairness of a proceeding is 
challenged by a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because the right 
to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the 
sixth amendment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary 
to accord defendants the ample opportunity to meet the case of the 
prosecution to which they are entitled, State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 533 
(Utah App. 1997). Quoting Strickland, supra worse, Mr. Terry and Ms. Reid 
failed even to investigate the reason for Needham's failure to confront 
Tebbs. See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 188 (holding that if defense counsel fails 
to adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, 
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counsels performance cannot be viewed as reasonable. At a minilnum, Mr. 
Terry and Ms. Reid should have inquired of Needham as to the reason for 
his absence for the critical deposition of Tebbs. Additionally, Mr. Terry and 
Ms. Reid were given the same docu1nentation given to DOPL and fifth 
district court Washington County that had judicated any financial 
obligation to BACT ro Tebbs, and refused to admit any of· the documents 
alleging it "was little to no evidentiary value" Evidential hearing April 9, 
2014 p. 41, was the question by Mr. Gordan and Mr. Terry response, "that is 
correct". (p. 41 id) 
Mr. Terry answer of his evaluation of the exhibits presented in the 
rule 23B remand affidavit, that Needhan1 wanted to present. Yeah, even 
though Aaron Needham had an ongoing concern that he was not present at 
the deposition I did not feel that those concerns or that the reason 
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he was not there was any grounds to not have the deposition be used in trial 
pursuant to the stipulation ... .Inadvertently thought about trying to keep the 
deposition out of the trial. ... .id p. 43. 
Mr. Terry and Ms. Reid sub1nitted to the court a witness list in November 
2012 that supported the exhibits in the affidavit of the rule 23B remand and 
notified petitioners the day of the trial that they had subpoena none of the 
witnesses, I will tell you that all of the witnesses and potential witnesses 
that we have intended to call during our case, it won't be necessary to call 
them because that information will either come forward through Mr. 
Needham testimony or has already come out in the testimony of the state's 
witnesses "so the only witness that we will have, the only witness for the 
defense will be Mr. Needham, himself. Trial date January 14, 2013 - sixth 
day p.3 and Terry identified 
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at the April 9, 2014 hearing on page 36 that he had been a criminal defense 
attorney for "thirty years last year". The exhibit 7 of the evidential hearing 
was also submitted to the court on April 26, 2013 by paid counsel Herschel 
Bullen that identified six transactions performed at the title companies of 
funds issued to Needhan1 by the title companies after Clement Tebbs signed 
on the dockets that contradicts Tebbs statements on the deposition page 46-
47. 
Ms. Reid and Mr. Terry claim this evidentiary material is not 
evidential and refused to present it to the court or bring a single witness to 
testify in support of the exhibits presented in the remand affidavit. 
Additionally if as indicated by the handwritten note on the Grealish letter, it 
was provided to defense counsel, it would have been grossly insufficient for 
h·ial counsel to have entirely failed to cross-examine 
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Mr. Grealish about it. Such a failure would have amounted to entirely 
failing to subject Grealish testimony to meaningful adversarial testing. 
By the State admitting to the court the John Grealish agreement with 
the State that was prepared by Wade Farroway, Assistant Attorney General. 
It does show that Jake Taylor was in possession of the documents emailed 
to Scherie Wilcox for Mr. Farroway review after the preliminary hearing in 
July 2011. Upon completion of Farroway's review of the documents, he 
proposed a plea deal be arranged on August 2011 per remand affidavit 
exhibits. Shortly after offering the plea deal, Farroway was substituted by 
Jake Taylor, Assistant Attorney General to whom admitted none of the 
documents admitted to Scherie Wilcox and Wade Farroway except the John 
Grealish letter. Also, none of the appointed counsel 
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would admit the documents given to Farroway. Only paid counsel ever 
presented the exhibits to the courts. 
There are multiple standards in Utah under which new trial should 
be granted based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The base standard is 
that but for counsels deficient performance there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different, State v. Smith, 65 
P.3d 648, 656 (Utah App. 2003). Confidence in the outcome may be 
undermined at some point substantially short of the more probably than not 
portion of the spectrum, State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). In 
other cases, counsel's ineffective assistance arises to the level of a structural 
error. A structural error is a defect that affects the frame work within which 
the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself, State 
v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 560 (Utah App. 1986) quoting, Arizona v. Fulmmante, 
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499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). Structural error is reserved for a limited class of 
cases in which a constitution error so undermines the fairness of the 
proceedings that prejudice must be presumed. Johnson v. U.S., 520 U.S. 461, 
468-69(1997), several counts have held that confrontation clause violations 
constitute just such a structural defect. See Campbell v. Rice, 302 P.3d 892, 900 
(9th 200), holding that exclusion of defendant from in chamber hearings was 
structural error. State v. Garcia-Contreras, 953 P.2d 533, 540-42(Arizona 1998), 
(enbanc)(holding that the defendants exclusion from the jury selection 
process was a structural defect. State v. Calderon, 13 P.3d 871, 878-79 (Kansas 
2000), moreover, the rational of these holdings is buttressed by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which held that the right of confrontation is 
not merely a right to reliable testimony but is a right to cross examination 
per se, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68. 
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"Where testhnonial statements are at issue the only indicium of reliability 
sufficient to satisfy constitutional de1nands is the one the constitution 
actually preserves: confrontation, id at 68-69. 
Unfortunately the type of confrontation, face to face and by well 
prepared counsel, contemplated by the constitution did not occur in this 
case. As a consequence, an egregious sixth amendment violation occurred, 
which amounted to a structural defect, requiring reversal regardless of 
whether the court believes the error may have been harmless. If an error is 
structural, it defies analysis by harmless error standards by affecting the 
entire adjudicatory frame work. Fulnzmante, supra at 309. Finally, where ther 
error in question amounts to a violation of a defendants right of 
confrontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution, its harmlessness is to judged by a higher standard, i.e. reversal 
is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
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State v. Villareal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995), quoting State v. Hackford, 737 
P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987). If a constitutional error has occurred, the burden 
shifts to the state to show that the error was hannless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), finally, it should be 
noted that when there is a constitutional requirement of effective assistance 
of counsel and a public defender's acts or omissions constitute ineffective 
assistance, the error is inputed to the state because the state is required to 
provide effective assistance of counsel to indigent criminal defendants, 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991). The defacto exclusion of 
Mr. Needham from Mr. Tebbs deposition, combined with trial counsels 
failure to object to the admission of the deposition into evidence at trial was 
deeply prejudicial to Needham. Moreover it amounted to a significant 
deprivation of state and federal constitutional rights, which shifts 
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the burden to prove harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to the state. This 
the state can not do. As noted herein, the testimony of Tebbs was the 
cornerstone upon which the state case rested. To assert that a failure to 
subject it to 1neaningful cross-examination was harmless is laughable. 
However, the use of the deposition of Tebbs at trial, under the 
circumstances under which it was taken, without objection from trial 
counsel, was structural error. Under both Utah Constitution and the United 
States Constitution, a defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel at 
all critical stages of his criminal proceeding. Wagstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 
778 (Utah App. 1990), critical stages of a criminal proceedings include 
arraignment, preliminary hearing and trial. See, Hamilton v. Alabama, 386 
U.S. 52, 55 (1961), the instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in this 
case during a critical stage of the proceedings amount to a constructive 
denial and thus a complete 
-31-
deprivation of the right to counsel amounting to a double violation of 
Needha1n' s rights to confrontation under the sixth amendment. 
If a litigant is constructively denied the assistance of counsel in a 
proceeding in which he is entitled to counsel, the adversary process itself is 
rendered inherently unreliable and prejudice is legally presumed. See, 
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 at 483. A litigant can be constructively denied 
counsel in several ways, a constructive denial of counsel occurs if counsel 
completely fails to subject the oppositions case to meaningful adversarial 
testing, Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006). Voluntariness of 
absence may not be presumed by the trial court, rather an inquiry into the 
defendants ability to appear at the proceeding is required and voluntariness 
of a defendant's absence from a proceeding is determined by considering 
the totality of the circumstances. State v. Wasamick, 
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31 P.3d 615, 624 (Utah App. 2001). Tebbs testimony was so integral to the 
states case, and because the defendant was so thoroughly denied assistance 
of counsel, he was constructively denied assistance of counsel in the fullest 
sense enunciated by the Mezies court. This structural error, prejudice 
presumed ren1ands for a new trial. Therefore, the court may review 
ineffective assistance of counsel clahn on direct appeal because record was 
sufficiently developed. U.S. v. Gigley, 213 P.3d 509, 516 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000), 
counsels failure to assert that trial counsel operated under a prejudicial 
conflict of interest was ineffective assistance because issue was obvious and 
would have resulted in reversal on appeal. Hammon v. Ward, 466 P.3d 919, 
927-31 (10th Cir. 2006), counsels failure to assert timely claim of double 
jeopardy violation was ineffective assistance of counsel because there was 
reasonable probability that defendant would have 
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prevailed on merger argument and neglecting to challenge duplicitous 
counts was not objectively reasonable tactical decision, U.S. v. Weathers, P.3d 
229, 230-39 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The cumulative error violate due process 
guarantee of fundamental fairness and necessitate a new trial. Taylor v. Ky, 
436 U.S. 478,488 n.15 (1978). Cumulative effect of 3 claims required reversal 
of conviction because individually claims warranted relief. Breakiron v. 
Horn, 642 P.3d 126, 131-32 n.5 (3rd Cir. 2011). Errors of prosecutions 
misconduct, improper jury instructions and deficient transcripts of 
proceedings required reversal because concerned central legal and factual 
issues of case and rendered trial fundamentally unfair. U.S. v. Delgado, 631 
P.3d 685, 710-11 (5th cir. 2011). The water shed procedural rule is one that 
raises the possibilities that someone convicted with use of the invalidated 
procedure might have been acquitted otherwise. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 
311 (1989). 
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The presumption of correctness overc01ne by clear and convincing evidence 
in exculpatory defense affidavit. Norton v. Spencer, 351 P.3d 1, 6-8 (1st Cir 
2003). Needham claims the right to a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the Writ is 
clear and indisputable per 28 U.S. cs 1651 l(a) and the issuance of writ is 
extraordinary remedy. U.S. Dist Court v. Kerr, 426 U.S. 394, 400(1976). The 
right to release from confinement on charges for which a petitioner could 
not be tried without a violation of Double jeopardy can be raised by habeas 
corpus under this rule, McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321 (UT 1983). Habeas 
Corpus may be used to test alleged violations of basic rights such as 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Ziegler v. Milkens, 583 
P.2d 1175 (UT 1978). The denial of the court's decision to grant a new h 4 ial 
by not recognizing the right of confrontation clause. A writ granted because 
district court abused its discretion in erroneously deciding a legal issue." 
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Qwest Comminications Int. Inc., 450 P.3d 1179, 1182-84 (10th Cir. 2006). Also, 
the denial of motion to dismiss on double jeopardy claim immediately 
appearable under collateral order doctrine. U.S. v. Carpenter, 494 P.3d 13, 25 
(1st Cir. 2007). Double jeopardy preserved by the statements and testimony 
of Kim Quon of DOPL who affirmed at the trial that DOPL did in fact have 
an investigation that resulted in Needham's license being renewed in 
November 2007. 
IX. Conclusion Rule 24(e)(10) UT R. App P 
Because the cumulative errors of the state's failure to disclose 
exculpatory impeachment evidence and the gross denial of Needham's fifth 
amendment constitutional rights of Double Jeopardy protections, the sixth 
amendment constitutional rights to confrontation and effective assistance of 
counsel, and the fourteenth amendment rights of due process, the 
proceeding 
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here in were 1nanifestly unfair. The cumulative effect of violating rights of 
Confrontation Clause, Double Jeopardy, effective assistance of counsel, 
rights of due process that were all violated by prosecutorial misconduct at a 
level of contempt on the court. Needham respectfully request of the court to 
issue a writ of Habeas Corpus and grant the Writ to protect Needham with 
relief from further injury. The multiple injuries inflicted qualify for an 
injunction under the "imminent danger exception." The State actors 
appointed by the court acted under conflict of interest by holding 
exculpatory material and inflicting multiple injuries that Needham has had 
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT l0K-MORE 
Amount Due: 155.00 
Amount Paid: 155.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COUNTER l0K-MORE 
Amount Due: 105.00 
Amount Paid: 105.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
Amount Due: 75.00 
Amount Paid: 75.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 










10-10-06 Case filed 
10-10-06 Judge JAMES L SHUMATE assigned. 
10-10-06 Filed: Complaint l0K-MORE 
10-10-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
10-10-06 COMPLAINT l0K-MORE Payment Received: 155.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT l0K-MORE, Mail Payment; 
12-29-06 Filed: Notice of Appearance 
02-20-07 Filed: Answer, Counter-Claim, Third-Party Complaint 
AARON NEEDHAM 
02-21-07 Fee Account created 
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CASE NUMBER 060501877 Contracts 
02-21-07 COUNTER lOK-MORE Payment Received: 105.00 




03-13-07 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
03-15-07 Filed: Motion for Damages, Attorney's Fees, and Costs regarding 









Filed by: OT DEVELOPMENT INC, 
Filed: Reply to Counterclaim and Jury Demand 
Fee Account created Total Due: 75.00 
JURY DEMAND - CIVIL Payment Received: 75.00 
Note: Code Description: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL, Mail Payment; 
Filed: Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Damages, Attorneys' 
Fees, and Costs Regarding Wrongfully Filed Lis Pendens 
Filed: Notice of Change of Firm Name and Address 
Filed: Attorney's Planning Meeting Report 
Fee Account created Total Due: 7.00 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 7.00 
Note: COPY FEE 
05-08-07 Filed: Aaron Needham's Early Case Conference List of Witnesses 
and Documents 
05-29-07 Filed: Answer to Third Party Complaint 
CLEMENT F TEBBS 
06-05-07 Filed return: Summons 
Party Served: BONNEVILLE BUILDERS LLC, 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 17, 2007 
06-05-07 Filed return: Summons 
Party Served: BOWN, JOLIE 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 17, 2007 
~ 06-05-07 Filed return: Summons 
Party Served: TEBBS, JOHN B 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 17, 2007 
06-05-07 Filed return: Summons 
Party Served: TEBBS, CLEMENT F 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 17, 2007 
06-07-07 Filed return: Summons 
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CASE NUMBER 060501877 Contracts 
Party Served: ADAMSON, GREG 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 01, 2007 
06-11-07 Filed: Aaron Needham's First Supplement to Rule 26{a) (1) 
Disclosures 
06-25-07 Filed: Answer to Third-Party Complaint 
GREG ADAMSON 
08-31-07 Filed: Attorney's Planning Meeting Report 
08-31-07 Filed return: Acceptance of Service 
Party Served: Kurt C. Faux 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: January 23, 2007 
09-10-07 Filed: Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
09-19-07 Filed: Notice of Withdrawal as Attorney for Defendants Aaron 
Needham, Kilauea Properties LLC, Needham Hornes Inc., and DT 
Development 
10-09-07 Filed: Certificate of Readiness for Trial 
08-23-10 Notice - Notice of Intent for Case 060501877 
Clerk: loris 
Notice is hereby given that, due to inactivity, the above entitled 
matter may be dismissed for lack of prosecution pursuant to Rule 
4-103, Code of Judicial Administration. Unless a written statement 
is received by the court within 20 days of this notice showing good 
cause why this should not be dismissed, the court will dismiss 
without further notice. 
11-10-10 Notice - Order of Dismissal for Case 060501877 
Based on a review of this file and Rule 4-103 Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, the Court orders this case be dismissed, without 
prejudice, for failure to file a Certificate of Readiness for Trial 
within 330 days of the first answer. 
11-10-10 Case Disposition is Dismsd w/o prejudice 
Disposition Judge is JAMES L SHUMATE 
11-10-10 Note: The case was taken off of OTSC hold 
11-18-10 Filed order: Order of Dismissal 
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE 
Signed November 18, 2010 
07-28-14 Judge G MICHAEL WESTFALL assigned. 
Printed: 01/27/16 11:23:32 Page 4 (last) 
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AARON D.T. NEEDHAM 
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RULING ON THE DEFENDANTS MOTIO'N; ·.;~ 
FOR A NEW TRIAL 
_) 
Defendant. 
Case No: 101500067FS 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
This matter came before the court on April 9, 2014, for an evidentiary hearing on the 
~ Defendant's Rule 24 URCrP Motion for a new trial. Based upon the evidence, the court finds 
as follows: 
1. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to have the jury view a video deposition which 
had been taken on Jun 14, 2014. In the spring of 2012, the State had filed a URCrP rule 14(a)(8} 
motion to take the deposition of Clement Tebbs. The basis for the motion was that Mr. Tebbs 
would not be able to attend trial based on his health. On the 24th of May, 2012, Judge John J. 
Walton entered an order allowing the State to take the deposition of Mr. Tebbs. The order 
indicates that the parties had agreed that the deposition would be taken in Murray, Utah on 
(!fl the 14th day of June 2012, beginning at 9:00 am. The Defendant did not objection to the State's 
motion and the video deposition was admitted into evidence and was shown to the jury. 
2. Mr. Tebbs and Mr. Needham had been in a business relationship wherein Mr. Tebbs 
financed the construction of homes in Southern Utah and Nevada. The State's charges were 
that Mr. Needham had converted funds to his own use. The defendant did not contest that he 
had received money from Mr. Tebbs which he had used for his own benefit. However, the· 
Defendant claimed that Mr. Tebbs had authorized him to use the funds for his own use. In 
support of this defense, the defendant produced a document which was purportedly signed by 
Mr. Tebbs. Therefore, the central issue in this case was not whether funds had been diverted, 
it was whether Mr. Tebbs had authorized the diversion of the funds. The State presented 
evidence that when Mr. Tebbs became aware that funds had been diverted, he asked Mr. 
Needham to meet with him. At trial the State produced four witness who were present at this 
(@ meeting. Each witness testified that during the meeting: Mr. Needham admitted he had 
diverted fund; he apologized for his conduct and promised to pay the money back; and that he 
1 
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made no claim that he had been given prior permission to use the funds for his own use. Later, 
an investigator from the State licensing board interview Mr. Needham. During this meeting, 
Mr. Needham did not claim that he had authority to use the funds for his own benefit. 
3. At trial, the state called John Grealish as a witness. Mr. Grealish was transported to 
Utah from another state, where he was serving a sentence on an unrelated offense. Mr. 
Grealish testified that Mr. Needham had diverted funds for his own benefit. Prior to trial and 
prior to the sentencing of Mr. Grealish, the State had sent a letter to the Honorable Clark 
Waddoups. (see exhibit 1) The letter informed the Court that Mr. Greal!sh had co-operated in 
the prosecution of Mr. Needham and had made himself available to testify in this matter. 
The State clearly had a duty to provide this letter to the defense prior to trial so that it 
was available for the cross-examination of Mr. Grealish (impeachment as to motive). Scheree 
Wilcox, a para legal for the Attorney General's Office, mailed a copy of the Grealish letter to 
Nathan Reeve, who was then counsel for Mr. Needham. The court believes that the letter was 
mailed to Mr. Reeve. However, Mr. Reeve withdrew and Erick Cramer was appointed. Mr. 
Cramer testified that he reviewed the file which he had received from Mr. Reeve and the 
Grealish letter was not in the file. Mr. Cramer later withdrew and Douglas Terry (trial counsel) 
was appointed. Mr. Terry testified that the Grealish letter was not in the file that he received 
from Mr. Cramer. It is therefore clear that the letter was not available to trial counsel and that 
trial counsel was not aware of its existence. 
This then presents an issue of whether the letter was actually received by Mr. Reeve. 
Mr. Nathan did not testify at the trial and neither party has addressed the issue of whether the 
State's duty under Brady is met when the material is mailed; or whether the State bears the 
burden to prove the material was actually received. Given the evidence in this case, the court 
need not resolve this issue. For the purposes of the analysis of this case, the court will assume 
that the letter was not mailed. 
As indicated, the defendant did not contest that he had diverted funds to his own use. 
Therefore, the central issue was whether he had authority to do this. At trial he claimed that 
he did and that Mr. Tebbs had signed a document agreeing that he could use the funds as he 
did·. However, four witness testified they were present when Mr. Needham admitted to using 
the funds without authority and that he apologized for doing so. When he was confronted he 
did not claim to have authority to divert the funds; neither did he make any reference to a 
document which granted him such authority. If Mr. Needham had prior authority he would not 
have admitted to wrong doing; and if he had an agreement which gave him authority to act as 
he did, he would have referred to the agreement and the document that memorialized the 
agreement. In a subsequent interview with an investigator from the licensing board, Mr. 
Needham did not claim that he had authority to use the funds for his own benefit. Also, at trial, 
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Mr. Needham testified that he could not work on a project in Nevada because the building 
inspector would not allow the construction to proceed. The State brought Mr. Needhams 
credibility into question by calling the Nevada building official, who testified that the city did 
not prevent the construction from going forward. 
Based upon all the evidence presented at trial, the fact that counsel for the defense 
could not cross examine Mr. Grealish with the letter to Judge Waddoups does result in a 
reasonable probability that the results would have been different. This courts confidence in the 
jury verdict is not undermined. The State's case was strong and the defendants case relied 
primarily on his testimony and a document that purportedly gave him authority to use the 
funds. This was the heart of his defense and it was presented and considered by the jury. The 
Defendant's Brady motion is therefore denied. 
4. Scheree Wilcox, a para legal for the Attorney General's Office undertook the 
responsibility to schedule the video deposition of Mr. Tebbs. She sent Arie Cramer (counsel for 
Mr. Needham) a list of possible dates for the deposition. The lists included five dates (June 13, 
14, 15, 26, and 27). Mr. Cramer then provided this list to his investigator, Brooke Karrington. 
Mr. Cramer asked Ms. Karrington if she was available on these dates; he also asked her to check 
to see if Mr. Needham was available. Ms. Karrington called Mr. Needham and gave him the 
dates. Mr. Needham said that he preferred the June 26th date. At the hearing Mr. Needham 
testified that Ms. Karrington told him that the deposition would be on the 26th unless she 
called him back. Ms. Karrington testified that she did not tell Mr. Needham the deposition 
would be on the 26th unless she called him back. I find the testimony of Ms. Karrington to be 
more credible. 
5. The record is not clear as to when Mr. Needham actually received notice of the date 
of the deposition. Mr. Cramer testified that Mr. Needham "would have been notified". 
However, he did r:1ot have any specific memory that Mr. Needham was notified of the date of 
the deposition; nor did he have any record of a notice being sent to Mr. Needham. His 
testimony that Mr. Needham "would have been notified" merely indicates that it is his practice 
to notify clients of hearings. Ms. Karrington had the most contact with Mr. Needham during this 
time. She testified that she did not give Mr. Needham notice that the deposition would be held 
on the the 14th . She testified that in the weeks prior to the deposition she had many 
conversations with Mr. Needham in preparation for the deposition and that she "probably11 
referred to the deposition date in these conversations. On the other hand, Mr. Needham 
testified that he did not receive notice of the June 14th hearing prior to the 12th of June. The 
record does not contain specific evidence that Mr. Needham had notice of the deposition until 
(@ the 12th of June when Ms. Karrington called Mr. Needham to finalize their preparation for the 
deposition. In this matter the State has the burden to prove that Mr. Needham knowingly and 
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voluntarily absented himself from the deposition. To prove this, the State must prove that Mr. 
Needham had notice of the deposition. Notice is a prerequisite to a finding that Mr. Needham 
knowingly and voluntarily absented himself from the proceeding. Because the State has the 
burden of proof, the court will find that Mr. Needham was first notified of the date of the 
deposition on June 12, 2012. 
6. On the 1th of June 2012 Ms. Karrington again talked to Mr. Needham about the 
deposition. Mr. Needham said that he thought the deposition was scheduled on the 26th• Mr. 
Needham said that he could not attend the deposition because he was required to be a witness 
in an Arbitration hearing and that he had just got back from Salt Lake City that day and his 
health would not allow him to travel back to Salt Lake for the deposition. Ms. Karrington asked 
him to provide her with a copy of the Subpoena to the arbitration hearing. Mr. Needham 
promised to do this, but did not provide the subpoena until the 15th (which was after the 
deposition has held). Without a subpoena, the parties where unable to verify Mr. Needham's 
scheduling conflict. Therefore, Mr. Cramer was unable to request a continuance based upon 
Mr. Needham's obligations to attend the arbitration hearing. 
7. Mr. Needham had received a subpoena on June 1, 2012 which required that he 
appear at an arbitration hearing on June 15, 2012. The letter which accompanied the subpoena 
indicated the hearing was scheduled to begin on June 12, 2012 and that Mr. Needham would 
be called as a rebuttal witness. However, the letter informed Mr. Needham that he might not 
be needed to testify; but that if he had not heard from the attorney who issued the subpoena 
by June 14th, he should appear on the 15th • The stated date for Mr. Needham to appear was on 
the 15th; the letter did not indicate that Mr. Needham was to make himself available to appear 
on the 12th, 13th , or 14th • Nevertheless, Mr. Needham testified that he was concerned about 
when he should appear so he called the attorneys office and was instructed to appear on the 
13th • He testified that he appeared at the attorney's office on the 13th and was instructed to 
appear again on the 14th • He testified that he appeared on the 14th but was then released from 
his subpoena and never testified. At the hearing Mr. Needham initially testified that he had 
never talked to JoAnne Jorgensen (the attorney who had issued the subpoena). After his 
counsel referred him to a prior statement in his deposition, he changed his testimony and 
testified that he had talked to JoAnne Jorgensen. In his deposition, Mr. Needham had stated 
that it was JoAnne Jorgensen who had requested that he appear on the 13th • 
When Ms. Karrington talked to Mr. Needham on the 12th, she asked Mr. Needham to 
send her a copy of the subpoena that he had received to attend the arbitration hearing. This 
was obviously an attempt to verify the conflict so that Mr. Cramer could request that the 
deposition be continued. Mr. Needham had the subpoena in his possession at that time and 
promised to send her a copy of the subpoena, but he did not send Ms. Karrington a copy of the 
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subpoena until the 15 th (the day after the deposition). Mr. Needham testified at the hearing 
that, at the request of someone from the office that had issued the arbitration subpoena, he 
went to the attorneys office on the 13th and 14th of June. He testified that he signed something 
that said that he had appeared on the 13th and 14th• However, he did not produce this 
document. There was certainly someone from that office that could verify that Mr. Needham 
was present at the arbitration on the 13th and 14th (or some documentation that would show 
his presence at those times); however, no witness was called to verify his attendance at the 
arbitration hearing and no explanation was given as to why this information may not have been 
available. Mr. Needham knew that, because the subpoena only required him to attend on the 
15th (the day following the deposition), the subpoena did not prevent him from attending the 
deposition on the 14th• In the Courts judgment, that is the reason that he did not send Ms. 
Karrington a copy of the subpoena on the 1ith as he had promised. In the Courts judgment, Mr. 
Needham also testified that he was required to be at the arbitration on the 13th and 14th in 
order to create a conflict in his schedule. The Court does not believe that he was required to be 
present at the attorney's office on the 13th or the 14th • 
Based on the evidence, the Court concludes that the Mr. Needham's obligations with 
respect to the arbitration hearing, did not prevent Mr. Needham from being present at the 
deposition. 
8. During the June 12th conversation, Ms. Karrington explained that Mr. Needham could 
attend the hearing via video conferencing and explained how a video conference could be 
arranged and how it would work. At the hearing, Mr. Needham testified that Ms. Karrington 
never talked to him about video conferencing. Mr. Needham also testified that, when he talked 
lJi to Ms. Karrington on the 12th, Ms. Karrington told him the date of the deposition had been 
changed. Ms. Karrington testified that the date of the deposition had not been changed and 
that she never told Mr. Needham that it had been changed. Ms. Karrington's testimony 
regarding these issues is more credible. 
9. In his March 7, 2013 deposition hearing (paragraph 2) Mr. Needham states: "On May 
24th, 2012 this court issued an Order Granting Application for Order Allowing Deposition of 
Clement F. Tebbs~ It was my understanding that this deposition was being taken in Salt Lake 
City Utah due to the failing health of Mr. Tebbs and that the deposition would be used in lieu of 
his personal appearance and live testimony at trial in the above matter." In his email to Brooke 
Karrington dated June 15th Mr. Needham stated: "The deposition was set up so Clem would not 
be at trial because of his medical issues." Mr. Needham was therefore aware that the 
deposition would be used at trial and that the deposition would likely present the only 
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Tebbs. Mr. Needham was aware that it was expected that 
the medical problems of Mr. Tebbs would preclude him from appearing in St. George to testify 
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at trial. Although he was clearly aware that Mr. Tebbs' health was fragile and that he was 
unable to travel; when Counsel for the State cross-examined Mr. Needham at the evidentiary 
hearing, Mr. Needham would not acknowledge that he was aware that Mr. Tebbs was in failing 
health or unable to travel. The State contends that Mr. Needham was aware that Mr. Tebbs 
could not attend trial and that Mr. Needham believed that the deposition would not go forward 
if he did not attend; thus delaying the trial. In the courts judgment, this argument has merit. 
10. At the hearing, Mr. Needham testified that he always believed the deposition would 
be held on the 26th of June. However, on the 15th of June, 2012 (a day after the deposition), 
Mr. Needham sent Ms. Karrington an email which stated: "I just for{sic) back from salt lake city 
from picking up my kids and had I known that the meeting was this week. I would have made 
arrangements to stay. But I didn't know I had set up for august 26 is which is the date that I 
agrees too." (Exhibit C to Exhibit 6) This statement conflicts with his testimony at the hearing 
that he had always believed that the deposition would be held on the 26th of June. 
11. After the Defendant received notice on the 1ith of June, he did not take any action 
to arrange to be in Murray on the 14th • There is regular airline service between South West 
Utah and Salt Lake. Flights to Salt Lake City are available from both Cedar City and St. George 
on a daily basis. Therefore, it was possible for Mr. Needham to fly to Salt Lake, which would 
have dramatically reduced the time he was required to sit. Mr. Needham testified that, in the 
past, he had agreed to fly to the Middle East in connection with his business as a carbon 
footprint expert. He testified that this long flight was possible in spite of his medical conditions 
because he would be flying on a private plane which would allow for him to lay down. 
Therefore, according to Mr. Needham, it is possible for him to travel over long periods of time, 
if he is able to lay down. Yet, Mr. Needham made no attempt to arrange for someone to drive 
him to Murray in a vehicle that would have allowed him to recline or lay down. 
12. Mr. Needham is a paraplegic. In this case Mr. Needham has testified that his 
physical condition prevented him from attending the hearing. He testified that it is extremely 
difficult for him to travel. However, he does drive a vehicle to Salt Lake City or Brigham City to 
pick up his children for summer visitation. He testified that in order to do this, it is necessary 
for him to go up (to Salt Lake City or Brigham City) on one day, rest one day, and then travel 
back to St. George on the third day. However, in his March 7, 2013 affidavit (exhibit 6, para 7) 
Mr. Needham stated that he went to Salt Lake on June 11th and returned on the next day, June 
12th . At the hearing, Mr. Needham changed his testimony and testified that he did ·not go to 
Salt Lake on 11th • He testified that he went to Fillmore on the 11th to pick up his children; and 
that he was only able to return the next day because Fillmore was much closer than Salt Lake. 
However, in an email to Ms. Karrington dated June 15, 2012 {Exhibit C to Exhibit 6) Mr. 




travel on the 12
th
. This conflict in his testimony is troubling, especial in view of the fact that he 
also testified at the hearing that when he prepared the affidavit he had his records before him. 
At the hearing he repeatedly stated that, because he had his records before him when he 
prepared the affidavit, the affidavit would be the most accurate (as compared to his testimony 
at the hearing). These statements of Mr. Needham are in direct contradiction to his testimony 
at the hearing that he went the Fillmore on the 11th; and that he was unable to travel to and 
from Salt Lake City on successive days; and seriously undermine his testimony that his physical 
condition prevents him from travelling to and from Salt Lake City on successive days. 
Mr. Needham testified that for the past several years he has been in need of frequent 
medical assistance; including that he was on life support at one time. It is therefore likely that 
there are medical professionals (including his primary physician, Dr. Gandhi) who possessed 
information concerning how his medical condition may affect his ability to travel. Mr. Needham 
did present a letter from Dr. Gandhi, which lists his medical conditions. Howev·er, the letter 
does not discuss how these conditions may affect Mr. Needham's ability to travel. While it is 
clear that, as a paraplegic, Mr. Needham has many limitations; there is no medical evidence 
that these limitation would prevent him from travelling to and from Salt Lake on successive 
days. (Which is, in fact, what Mr. Needham stated he did in his March 7, 2013 affidavit; and in 
his June 15th email to Ms. Karrington. (Exhibit 6)) 
Because his primary physician, Dr. Gandhi, did not indicated that Mr. Needham could 
not travel to and from Salt Lake on successive days. We must rely on Mr. Needham's statement 
that travel on successive days is impossible.1 There are many instances where Mr. Needham, in 
the Courts judgment has been untruthful in his testimony. He testified that he has always 
believed that the Deposition was scheduled on June 12th; however, in his June 15th email to Ms. 
Karrington, Mr. Needham indicated that he believed the deposition was scheduled in August. 
The court has found that he was not truthful when he testified that Ms. Karrington told him 
that he should consider the deposition to be scheduled on June 26th unless Ms. Karrington 
notified him otherwise. He was untruthful when he testified that when Ms. Karrington talked 
to him on the 1ith she said that deposition dated had been changed to the 14th • He was 
untruthful when he said that Ms. Karrington did not talk to him about video conferencing. 
These statements severely undermine the credibility of Mr. Needham. 
~ Based on all of the evidence, the Court will find that Mr. Needham's medical conditions 
did not prevent him from travelling to Murray to attend the deposition. The Court finds that 
Mr. Needham can travel to and from Salt Lake City on successive days. Mr. Needham was 
therefore able to travel to Salt Lake to attend the deposition on June 14, 2012. In addition, 
1 At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties entered a stipulation to the testimony of Mr. Needham's mother. 
The Court has considered this stipulation and its effect on the evidence in reaching its findings in this matter. 
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other arrangements could have been made that would not have required Mr. Needham to 
drive (i.e. airline flights or travel in a vehicle where Mr. Needham could recline or lay down). 
However, Mr. Needham made no attempts to arrange for alternate transportation. In addition, 
Mr. Needham was aware that it was possible to conduct the hearing via video conferencing. 
Given the technology which is available to conduct hearings in this manner, Mr. Needham 
could have viewed the entire deposition proceedings and would have been able to 
communicate confidentially with Mr. Cramer. Under the circumstances of this case, that 
process would have been sufficient to afford Mr. Needham his constitutional rights to be 
present and confront Mr. Tebbs. 
Mr. Needham was aware of the date and time of the deposition and had the ability to 
attend in person or be present via video conferencing. He made no effort to attend the 
hearing; and he declined to conduct the hearing via video conferencing. He chose not to attend 
in the belief that the deposition would not go forward in his absence. He was aware of the 
fragile health of Mr. Tebbs and sought to delay the date for the deposition to a date that Mr. 
Tebbs may not have been available to give testimony. 
13. The Court finds that the State has met its burden to prove that Mr. Needham 
knowingly and voluntarily absented himself from the deposition. He therefore waived his right 
to be present and confront Mr. Tebbs during his testimony. 
14. In his motion, Mr. Needham claims that Mr. Cramer was ineffective in his cross-
examination of Mr. Tebbs at the deposition. At the hearing on this motion, the state presented 
exhibit 5 which is a multiple page list of questions (and in some instances anticipated answers) 
which Mr. Needham wanted Mr. Cramer to ask Mr. Tebbs. Mr. Needham has failed to identify 
which questions were not asked and how the failure to ask a question or question 
demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel. The Defendant has also provided question that 
he believes Mr. Cramer should have asked at the deposition. (Exhibit 7) However, the 
Defendant has failed to provide the court with an explanation or analysis as to how the failure 
to ask a question or question demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel for Mr. 
Needham (Mr. Terry and Mr. Cramer) each testified that many of the defenses that Mr. 
Needham wanted to rely on where not relevant to his defense. The court has reviewed the 
questions in Exhibit 7 and has not identified any questions which relate to the central issue of 
whether Mr. Needham had authority to use funds for his own benefit. The questions in Exhibit 
7 are questions which go to the credibility of Mr. Tebbs. There is no analysis to help the court 
understand how the failure to ask these questions shows ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
Strickland analysis requires the defendant to initially show that counsels performance was 
deficient. There is no evidence that the failure of Mr. Cramer to ask any question at the 
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deposition constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, the Defendants motion 
with respect to that issue is denied. 
@ 15. With respect to the claim that Mr. Terry was ineffective in failing to object based on 
the right of confrontation, the defendant waived the right of confrontation when he voluntarily 
absented himself from the deposition. Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance of counsel to 
object based on a right that the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived. 
16. In his affidavit (Exhibit 7) at paragraph 6, Mr. Needham stated that he did not 
believe that Mr. Terry knew the deposition was scheduled at a time when he could not be 
present. Mr. Needham does not claim that he informed trial counsel that he could not be 
present at the deposition because he was required to testify at an arbitration hearing, or that 
\:JI he could not travel due to his medical condition. Mr. Needham further indicated that he did 
not believe that Mr. Terry was aware of his claims concerning Mr. Cramer's lack of preparation, 
or his claim that Mr. Cramer did not have documents which were important for the cross-
examination of Mr. Tebbs. (Exhibit 7, para 6) 
From the time of the deposition of Mr. Tebbs, Mr. Needham possessed all of the 
information which would have given Mr. Terry grounds to object to the introduction of the 
Tebbs deposition. He failed to provide this information to trial counsel. Without this 
information, trial counsel had no basis to object. Therefore, Mr. Terry was not ineffective in 
ii} failing to object. 
Mr. Needham a_lso claims that Mr. Terry failed to subpoena record from title companies. 
This goes to the credibility of Mr. Tebbs. However, in view of the issues presented at trial, and 
considering all of the evidence which was presented, the Court does not believe that the failure 
to subpoena these records constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Dated this 26th day of May, 2014. 
A. Lynn Payne Sr. Distri_ct ~Q-~~'/~~~-."' 
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